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Abstract
There has long been a minority view that providing people with cash is an effective way of 
combating poverty and economic insecurity while promoting livelihoods and work. The mainstream 
view has been that giving people money, without conditions or obligations, promotes idleness and 
dependency, while being unnecessarily costly. Better, they contend, would be to allocate the available 
money to schemes that create jobs and/or human capital and that produce infrastructure. This 
paper reviews recent evidence on various types of scheme and on several pilot cash transfer schemes, 
assessing them by reference to principles of social justice.
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Introduction
As welfare states and classical forms of social security have crumbled, and particularly as those models have 
failed to take hold in developing countries, where informal employment is the norm, governments have 
begun to look at other innovative methods for enabling people to pursue sustainable and ‘decent’ livelihoods. 
It is increasingly recognized that policies that facilitate work can be more valuable than policies that create 
short-term jobs. In this regard, there has been a great flowering of experimental schemes around the world—
and renewed interest in other selective measures—in response to the fact that poverty and unemployment 
have remained persistently extensive in spite of economic growth.
To some extent, the emerging schemes have been shaped by the changing patterns of work and 
labour in the globalised economic system and by the realization that there is a growing incidence of social 
and economic shocks that expose people to more systemic insecurity, in which the livelihoods and reproduc-
tive capacity of whole communities are threatened, be it by a sudden economic decline or by a social collapse 
of entitlements due to a natural disaster, such as a famine, drought, a tsunami or earthquake, or an epidemic 
such as HIV/AIDS.
Besides critiquing traditional selective measures, this paper considers several cash-transfer schemes 
that have attracted policymakers and international donors in the globalization era, considering their effective-
ness and feasibility as responses to economic insecurity and mass threats to livelihoods and work. A discussion 
of cash-for-work and public works schemes, as perceived alternatives, can be found in the chapter on de-
mand-side employment schemes in the UN’s Report on the World Social Situation 2007 (UN, 2007: ch. 6).
Traditionally, politicians and policymakers in developing countries, and most donor agencies, 
including the international financial agencies, have dismissed the idea that poverty and unemployment can 
be redressed through cash transfers. They have looked to subsidies to producers or consumers of specific 
products, and have relied on some nucleus of social insurance and means-tested social assistance for those 
affected by particular contingency risks, such as accidents, loss of job, disability or old age. Many have shown 
a remarkable enthusiasm for public works. But they have given a very limited role to cash transfers per se. 
Recently, that has begun to change.
One reason has been that poverty and inequality have been shown to be problems that defy the oft-
made prediction that with economic growth will come ‘trickle down’ to the poor and economically insecure. 
With globalisation, such claims have been untenable. Another reason is that other forms of aid have been 
shown to have limited effectiveness, especially in contexts of systemic shocks, where there are mass entitle-
ment failures in which whole communities are blighted by an economic setback, an ecological disaster or an 
epidemic.
There is still considerable political resistance to the use of cash transfers. One can only hope that 
more informed debate will take place in a spirit of openness to new or revised ideas. In that regard, to help in 
assessing their potential, it may be useful to:2  DESA Working Paper No. 58
identify the nature of economic insecurity, • 
clarify the types of income-support schemes, and • 
set out the  •  principles or criteria on which to judge the appeal of alternative ways of assisting 
the economically insecure and disadvantaged.
Economic insecurity
Debates about alternative forms of social protection have assumed an added urgency because globalisation 
and economic informalisation appear to involve more pervasive economic insecurity rather than less, and 
growing inequalities. The character of that insecurity has changed too. Identifying that is a necessary aspect 
of identifying appropriate policies, and their likely effects on livelihoods and work patterns.
Briefly, economic insecurity reflects exposure to several forms of risk and uncertainty and a limited 
capacity to cope with adverse outcomes and to recover from those outcomes. To a greater or lesser extent, any 
individual could be said to be exposed to, first, idiosyncratic risk, i.e., risk of an adverse event that reflects 
life-cycle contingencies, such as a spell of unemployment, a work-related accident or illness, or a disabling 
accident. This is the sphere of classic social security schemes. Second, there is co-variant risk, i.e., where a risk 
of one adverse event is tied to risks of others, where one adverse event has a high probability of precipitating 
one or more other mishaps.
This leads to the distinction between shocks and hazards. Shocks have become more numerous as a 
result of globalisation and global warming. Included are the sharp economic downturns that sweep whole 
communities, economies or regions. More generally, there are circumstances that one can characterise as 
socio-economic disasters, whether they be quick-onset disasters, as in the cases of earthquakes, floods, tsunamis 
or a sudden economic collapse, or slow-onset disasters, as in the case of famines, droughts or an epidemic 
such as HIV/AIDS, which threaten the livelihoods and reproductive capacity of whole communities as they 
affect more members of them.
These situations of shock should be distinguished from the notion of hazards, which are very impor-
tant sources of economic insecurity in many developing countries and which may be defined as predictable 
(and often desired) life events that have a probability of an adverse effect, or a sequence of adverse effects, for 
an individual or family. These include a death of a relative, weddings, births, a migration event, and retire-
ment.
In each of these cases—shocks or hazards—the resultant costs could erode a household’s capacity 
to sustain its normal livelihood base, perhaps by pushing it into debt, into mortgaging land or by prevent-
ing it from buying seeds or fertilisers. Given the relatively high probability of such events, an insurance 
policy would entail high premia or more simply would not be feasible. For some types of event, an insur-
ance scheme would involve a high moral hazard, i.e., the prospect of a compensatory payment would make 
it more likely that the event would occur, which would mean either that an insurer would wish to monitor 
very closely or that the amount of compensation would be linked to proof of actual costs associated with the 
event or to some predetermined acceptable level of costs to be covered.
Economic insecurity also arises from uncertainty. With uncertainty, one is unsure about one’s actual 
interests or unsure how to realise them. The outcome of decisions cannot be predicted with any confidence, 
and often this is combined with a perceived inability to know what to do if an adverse outcome materialises. How Cash Transfers Boost Work and Economic Security          3
A high degree of uncertainty pushes people into more risk-averse behaviour, especially if the consequences of 
an adverse outcome could be catastrophic. Those producing in agrarian economies or where economic activ-
ity is dependent on climate or ecological conditions are likely to face a high level of uncertainty. Anything 
that lessened that uncertainty could be expected to have a beneficial effect on higher-yielding investment, 
innovation and purposive decision-making.
Security arises from being able to deal with shocks, hazards and uncertainty. Although it will not be 
argued at length, it is a premise of this paper that basic economic security is essential for freedom and devel-
opment, and would enhance the pursuit of ‘dignified work’. Basic economic security is defined as a threefold 
set of circumstances.
First, it requires limited exposure to idiosyncratic, co-variant and systemic risks, uncertainty, haz-
ards and shocks. Second, it requires an ability to cope with those if they materialise. And third, it requires an 
ability to recover from those outcomes. It is this last that has been insufficiently emphasised, and relates very 
much to the notion of livelihood regeneration and thus ‘dignified work’. The schemes reviewed in this paper 
should be considered in terms of their ability to promote both economic security and dignified work.
Types of income scheme
At the outset, a key set of distinctions should be made. We may say that a scheme is universalistic if it is 
intended for all the population as a right, although perhaps based on citizenship or long-term residence. A 
scheme is targeted if it is intended for a specific group, defined by some sort of test of eligibility, be it poverty, 
age, employment capacity or whatever. A scheme is selective if it uses some specified criteria to determine 
eligibility, such as a means test or a “proxy means test”. A scheme is conditional if it requires some specified 
behaviour, usually work-related, on the part of the recipient or intended recipient, or in some cases family 
members of the recipient.
In practice, there are instances of targeted universalistic schemes, in that all those belonging to a 
particular social group are made eligible regardless of their means. An example is the universalistic social pen-
sion, which has been introduced in several countries, such as Namibia and Mauritius. More common at the 
moment are targeted selective schemes, whereby the intended beneficiaries are defined by their social group 
(e.g., women with young children) and by their poverty (having an income or assets below some threshold 
value).
In this regard, means-testing has come in for a great deal of criticism because of the difficulty of ap-
plying meaningful tests in developing countries, where establishing a person’s income is very hard, especially 
as it is likely to fluctuate erratically and substantially. Such tests are not only inequitable, but often prevent 
low-skilled workers, in particular, from being able to take up work opportunities, through what are known as 
poverty traps or unemployment traps.
The criticism that means-testing is impractical in low-income environments has led to the use of 
proxy means testing, which has been used in many countries since it was first used in Chile in 1980 (Clert and 
Woden, 2001; Raczynski, 1991). Proxy means testing is where visible indicators of income are used (such as 
quality of housing) to determine eligibility for a particular benefit. Such tactics have been used in countries 
as diverse as Argentina, Armenia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica, Honduras, Nicaragua, the 
Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Gaza and the West Bank, and Zimbabwe.4  DESA Working Paper No. 58
The trouble is that this technique requires the authorities to select relevant proxy indicators of social 
deprivation, such as location of residence, quality of the household’s dwelling or type of economic activity 
the household is doing. None of these is a very reliable indicator of poverty per se. Accordingly, some author-
ities have been drawn to rely on relatively sophisticated statistical models using a few variables to estimate the 
profile of somebody who should be regarded as in need. Although a remarkably large number of countries 
have made use of proxy means tests in recent years, it must be said that the technique is prone to the three 
types of failure that should be used to assess any social protection scheme.
Schemes can have a high or low exclusion error—that is, they may end up excluding a large or small 
number of those for whom the benefit is supposedly intended. This is particularly likely with area-based 
targeting. Schemes may also have a high or low inclusion error—that is, they may include a few or many of 
those for whom the benefit is not intended. Third, schemes may have a high or low administrative cost rela-
tive to the cost of the overall scheme. Many schemes are vitiated by excessive administrative costs that mean 
that far fewer people can be beneficiaries, given limited resources.
In the case of proxy means tests, it should be clear that, unless done carelessly, collecting and analyz-
ing data to be used in a formula to identify the targeted group will involve hefty administrative costs, starting 
with the collection of reliable data through complex social surveys, and substantial exclusion errors, in that 
even the best econometric equations only estimate about 50 per cent of the variability of income, implying a 
very imperfect means of identification of potential recipients of the transfer payment or selection for a public 
works slot (Coady, Grosh and Hoddinnott, 2004). And they also involve obvious immoral hazards, i.e., if the 
proxy indicator is known to the possible recipients they will have an incentive to do without it.
So, it is evident that the design of schemes can be highly variable, with scope for diverse forms of 
selectivity and conditionality. One would expect that the impact would depend very much on those design 
features. But what are most appropriate? What are the criteria one should identify in order to assess their 
relative appeal?
In what follows, we consider the main types of scheme intended to promote economic security in 
developing countries with a particular focus on their effects on livelihoods, work and employment. One 
might say, reasonably enough, that the ideal scheme should enable people to develop their productive capaci-
ties and livelihoods in conditions of improving human and community development. But that still begs a lot 
of questions about how to evaluate those on offer.
Policy evaluation principles
Could we agree on the principles by which one may assess the relative appeal of different types of policy in-
tervention? One should surely be explicit and as transparent as possible about the criteria by which to judge 
policy options. One of the problems with political debate and ‘assessments’ of alternative policies is precisely 
that the principles by which they should be judged are made vague or left unspecified.
Following earlier work1, this paper is based on a belief that policies should be judged, or evaluated, 
by whether or not they satisfy the following five policy principles:
1  See, for example, ILO (2004). The author was principal author of that report, which drew on extensive empirical work 
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The Security Difference Principle
A policy or institutional change is socially just only if it improves the security and work 
prospects of the least secure groups in society.
So, for instance, if a policy boosted the job opportunities of middle-income groups while worsening the 
prospects of more disadvantaged groups, that could not be justifiable unless the losers were compensated in 
ways they found acceptable. The Security Difference Principle stems from Rawls, who from a liberal philo-
sophical perspective essentially argued that social and economic inequalities are only just if they allow for the 
betterment of the worst-off groups in society (Rawls, 1973).
Whether or not one accepts the Rawlsian perspective, this principle can stand as a moral precept. 
A policy should be judged by whether it helps the least secure. If it does not do so, one should be uneasy 
(especially if it benefits others who are not so insecure), unless some other principle is recognised that is de-
monstrably superior. If so, it would be up to the evaluator to state it and support it. A key point is that there 
should be a right to a minimal amount of resources so as to enhance the capacity to develop and to exercise 
‘effective freedom’.
The Paternalism Test Principle
A policy or institutional change is socially just only if it does not impose controls on some 
groups that are not imposed on the most free groups in society.
The second principle is conveniently ignored by too many donors and elite analysts working comfortably in 
affluence. Paternalism is rife. According to this principle, forcing people to do certain forms of labour or ‘job’ 
when others in society are not forced to do them would be counter to social justice, even if the government 
authorities genuinely believed that the policy would be for the material betterment of those required to do 
them. Underlying this principle is the Millian liberal view that there is a prima facie case against paternalism 
(except in the case of young children and those who are medically frail), particularly against those forms that 
constrain the freedoms of the disadvantaged.
Among other aspects, this principle requires that all groups who could be subject to paternalistic 
direction have a Voice (collective and individual) in order to represent their interests. Only with Voice can 
people have some semblance of control over their work and lives, and only by having control can there be any 
decent meaning in the idea of dignified work.
Relevant to the paternalism principle, it is notable that recent research on the popular subject of 
happiness has reiterated that people who have control over their work and life are happier than others, even 
taking account of the influence of access to benefits (Haidt, 2006). Control means, among other things, hav-
ing the capacity and opportunity to make decisions for oneself, without that being determined by the state, 
or by patriarchal figures or religious or other institutions that dictate how people must behave.
This principle is particularly important when considering how some governments have gone about 
social integration through welfare reforms. It is about ‘effective’ or ‘full’ freedom, for which basic economic 
security is essential.6  DESA Working Paper No. 58
The Rights-not-Charity Principle
A policy or institutional change is socially just if it enhances the rights of the recipient of 
benefits or services and limits the discretionary power of the providers.
This third principle is also crucial for assessing the appeal of alternative benefit schemes. A right is pos-
sessed as a mark of a person’s humanity or citizenship, and cannot be made dependent on some behavioural 
conditionality. So, for instance, people should not be expected to have to plead for assistance in times of 
need, or to have to rely on the selective benevolence of civil servants or politicians. Their social and economic 
entitlements should be rights, not matters for the discretionary decisions of bureaucrats or philanthropists or 
aid-donors, however well meaning those may be.
The “right to work”, much discussed and asserted for the past 150 years or more, is particularly 
relevant here. If there is such a right, then there must be an obligation on somebody to provide it. But who 
or what is it? And how could someone hold others to respect his or her ‘right’? One cannot sensibly say that 
there is a right for every person to be given a job of their unrestrained choice. Not everybody can be Presi-
dent or Chief Executive.
What one could defend is the principle that everybody should have a claim right to have an equally 
good opportunity to pursue and develop one’s work capacities and competencies. This equality of opportu-
nity requires policies and institutions to enable every person in society equally to develop their productive 
capacities, should they wish to do so. Guaranteeing people jobs that they do not want is scarcely an affirma-
tion of any right to work. But creating the space for them to pursue a decent working life surely is.
In this regard, there is much merit in the Article 1 of Title 1 of the Charter of Emerging Human 
Rights adopted at the Barcelona Social Forum in November 2004, drawn up by an international group 
including senior representatives of all the relevant UN bodies. This asserted the right to existence under con-
ditions of dignity, which comprised a right to security of life, a right to personal integrity, a right to a basic 
income, a right to healthcare, a right to education, a right to a worthy death and a right to work, defined as:
“The right to work, in any of its forms, remunerated or not, which covers the right to 
exercise a worthy activity guaranteeing quality of life. All persons have the right to the 
fruits of their activity and to intellectual property, under the condition of respect for the 
general interests of the community. ”
In sum, schemes should be evaluated by whether or not they strengthen or weaken those 
rights, with those strengthening them being preferable.
The Ecological Constraint Principle
A policy or institutional change is socially just only if it does not involve an ecological 
cost borne by the community or by those directly affected.
This is a quintessential 21st century principle. In other words, potential ecological consequences must be 
built into the policy, not be put as an afterthought. For instance, there may be a trade off between jobs and 
ecological sustainability and revival. Does a short-term growth maximisation strategy benefit all or most of 
the people living in a country? The commercial drive to pursue growth and profits without taking account of 
social externalities is a recipe for global ecological disaster.How Cash Transfers Boost Work and Economic Security          7
For evaluation purposes, what an ecological principle means is that transfer schemes or job creation 
schemes should be subject to the constraint that they should not deliberately or wilfully (carelessly) jeopardise 
the environment. In this context, for instance, one could argue that subsidies intended to boost skills, employ-
ment or job-creating investment should be modified to promote only ecologically beneficial work and skills.
The ecological constraint principle raises emotional reactions, with claims that any such condition is 
a protectionist device that penalises developing countries, forcing them to slow economic growth and incur-
ring costs that hinder development. Regrettably, in the coming decades global warming and other forms of 
pollution—including many emanating from poor working conditions in the specious interest of job promo-
tion—will hurt many more people in developing countries and do so more devastatingly. The principle must 
be respected everywhere.
The Dignified Work Principle
A policy or institutional change is just only if it does not impede people from pursuing work in a dignified 
way and if it does not disadvantage the most insecure groups in that respect.
To some degree, this work principle is incorporated in the Rights-not-charity Principle. However, the two-part 
test in this principle involves two implicit value judgments—that work that is dignifying is worth promot-
ing (whereas any deterioration in working conditions or in opportunities would not be), and that the policy 
should enhance the range and quality of work options of the most insecure groups relative to others, or more 
than for others. While this may seem complicated, the main point is to determine whether or not a scheme 
favours the development of more freely chosen work opportunities and work capabilities.
In sum, we can proceed based on five policy principles for evaluating alternative income support 
schemes. We make no attempt to state priorities, merely that they can be used as a guide for evaluations and 
policy design. Schemes that satisfy all of the principles would be ideal. Although a comparative assessment of 
policies might be based on more than the five principles, they may be regarded as a coherent set of principles 
consistent with a belief in a complex egalitarianism, in which the expansion of full freedom is given priority, 
which requires basic economic security for all. One can criticise this position. However, if anybody wishes to 
specify alternative principles for evaluation, those should be stated clearly and transparently.
Before proceeding, it is also worth recalling Tony Atkinson’s two measures of poverty-reduction 
efficiency—vertical and horizontal, the former measuring the extent to which there is leakage of money 
intended for the poor going to the non-poor, the latter measuring the extent to which the poor are actually 
helped (Atkinson, 1995).
The difficulty with that dualism is that, for example, a scheme may reach 70 per cent of a target 
group, but those may be the least severely affected, leaving the worst-off 30 per cent no better off or even 
worse off. Using the horizontal-vertical efficiency approach could produce other difficulties. For instance, if 
another programme reached 70 per cent who were the worst-off and did so at the cost of some leakage to the 
non-poor, that might be judged less efficient, without good reason. For this sort of reason, it is advisable to 
be cautious about evaluating policies using the language of efficiency.
The following deals briefly with several alternatives to direct cash transfers and then turns to more 
detailed discussion of conditional and universal forms of transfer. It leaves out of consideration cash-for-work 
and emergency public works. As noted earlier, these are assessed in chapter 6 of the UN’s Report on the 8  DESA Working Paper No. 58
World Social Situation 2007 (UN, 2007) that concentrates on the latest variant of that approach, the Guar-
anteed Rural Employment Scheme in India, using the same principles or criteria.
Food subsidies and food aid
Perhaps the most common, and most easily understood, form of poverty relief and emergency response is di-
rect food aid, through ‘food parcels’ and the like. The provision of subsidized food or rations fits in the same 
mould, as does the distribution of other commodities in response to poverty or an emergency.
The primary claim in favour of food aid and food subsidies is that they respond to the priority needs 
of the poor. It is an anti-poverty device. It is also perceived to be better than other interventions because it is 
likely to be ‘horizontally efficient’ in that it is self-selecting. The poor will want the food aid, the wealthier will 
not value it because they will already have enough food, making their application for the food or subsidies 
unattractive. Food aid, it is reasoned, will also be relatively appreciated by recipients, while giving it out, or 
subsidizing food with tax or donor assistance, will be easy to legitimize with donors and the ‘median voter’.
The main criticism of food aid, and of food subsidies, is that it is likely to involve an inappropriate 
type of aid, in that the vulnerable may not lack food per se, or may not see their future as made secure by ac-
cess to more food. Such commodity-based aid is also paternalistic, in that it presumes that, first, what people 
want is more food, and/or second, that they would not spend money on food if given the freedom to make 
choices for themselves.
Food aid is also potentially market distorting, eroding incentives for local farmers, especially if the 
food is coming from outside the local community. It can thus disrupt local livelihoods and employment. 
Even the prospect of an influx of food aid must act as a deterrent to local farmers or producers or market 
traders. It may thus fail the Dignified Work Principle.
It also tends to strengthen a sense of charity rather than economic rights. Food aid or subsidies tend 
to make the food less appreciated than if the person has to pay the actual monetary value. This is always a 
consequence of a subsidy. So, it will tend to result in waste, due to undervaluation and/or excessive con-
sumption because it is ‘free’. Distributing food aid also has high transaction costs and high administrative 
costs. In India, the widely-used meals-for-school scheme is notorious—each rupee of food costs a rupee to 
distribute.
Waste due to undervaluation is likely to be compounded by bureaucratic failure, due to ‘soft budget’ 
constraints and lack of any pressure to maintain quality. People in receipt of charity cannot be too choosy. 
And bureaucrats dispensing charity are unlikely to be too careful.
Finally, food aid often leads to perverse targeting, giving to those without need for food while not 
reaching those who do need it, while also involving leakages due to locational failure, giving food to where 
needs are actually less than in some other areas.2 Thus it may, perversely, fail to satisfy the Security Difference 
Principle as well.
Of course, food aid has been the classic form of aid in times of emergency. But recently it has been 
more widely recognized that either it is inappropriate or, more likely, that to be effective it must be com-
2  A series of People’s Security Surveys in Africa and Asia found that it was the near-poor who were more likely to be 
aware of such schemes and more likely to receive them compared with the poor or destitute. ILO (2004).How Cash Transfers Boost Work and Economic Security          9
bined with cash grants if the intervention is to prevent the collapse of livelihood capacity in the communi-
ties directly affected. There is now considerable evidence from many food aid schemes that, without money, 
many recipients have to sell their food aid or cannot retain their parcel of land or raw materials because of 
accumulating debt.
This was found to be the case, for instance, in an evaluation of food aid given to refugees in Chad 
(LeJeune, 2004). In such cases, the visible risk for the local population may be malnutrition, but that does 
not mean that the appropriate intervention is food aid. What is required is intervention that can re-create 
conditions of adequate economic security to allow individuals, households and the local community to 
reproduce its productive and work capacity so that they themselves can produce or purchase food in local 
markets. In the case of refugees, of course, that means legitimizing their residential rights so that they can 
work without excessive fear of being driven away.
An example of a food aid scheme that highlights a failure to respect the policy principles outlined 
earlier is what happened in the Great Lakes region of Africa, where a review of emergency food interven-
tions found that aid agencies had responded to perceived food insecurity with food aid and seed provision. It 
seemed that donor agencies decided in advance on what was required, and then focused on who to assist and 
how much to give, rather than consider the nature of the overall threat to the communities’ livelihoods and 
work patterns (Levine and Chastre, 2004).
It turned out that what was most needed was cash support to enable the community to revive their 
livelihoods and deal with market pressures. The result was that economic revival was not achieved. The key 
lesson was that food security could have been enhanced if policies had enabled the community to work 
productively and securely. Cash transfers could have enabled the community to overcome the bottlenecks to 
revived production.
Another example highlighting the inefficiencies of food aid, and a failure to promote dignified liveli-
hoods, is what has been happening in Afghanistan, where it has been extensively used. Beneficiaries have 
been found to be selling the food they had received as aid for less than a third of the cost of the delivery of 
the food (Development Researchers Network, 2003). This sort of situation is likely to occur with all forms of 
commodity-based assistance. But with an in-kind transfer, there is also a tendency for beneficiaries (or others 
to whom they sell it) to consume more of the subsidized good than they would do otherwise, meaning that 
consumption would go beyond the point where the marginal benefit (value to the person) is equal to the 
marginal social cost (Tabor, 2002).
Clearly, if the value of food aid is perceived as much below its production and distribution costs, 
something is wrong. Thus, an evaluation of food aid in Ethiopia concluded that households would have 
taken much less in cash than the market value of their food aid and been equally satisfied (Barrett and Clay, 
2003). 3 Cash would have been less expensive, and would have been freedom-enhancing. Paternalism has 
typically prevailed, at the cost of limiting the revival capacities in local communities.
Nobody seriously questions the need for food aid in the immediate aftermath of major ecological 
disasters. However, beyond that situation, it tends to fail the Policy Principles enunciated earlier, particularly 
the Paternalism Test and Rights-not-Charity principles, since it involves a donor determination that what the 
recipients need is food per se and a determination to give them what the donors have available in particular. 
3  See also Barrett, Holden and Clay (2002).10  DESA Working Paper No. 58
It does little to promote dignified work and may do ecological damage in eroding local staple production 
and altering tastes in favour of imports that cost more to produce and distribute.
Vouchers and Food Stamps
While food aid and commodity-based aid schemes have been edging back in favour, donors and policy 
analysts have shifted their hopes to various types of voucher, which have come into vogue in recent years, 
whether as a measure to boost education, or to boost nutrition or to overcome some forms of poverty. In 
developing countries, the most common voucher schemes have been for seeds and other agricultural inputs, 
the intention being to boost agricultural output and employment while curbing food poverty.
Vouchers have also been used in foreign aid to communities hit by economic or natural disasters. 
For instance, they were used in the aftermath of the tsunami, in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and elsewhere; they 
have been used in the occupied Palestinian territories, and were used by the UK government in its response 
to the Montserrat volcanic eruption. Significantly, in the latter case, the authorities eventually switched to 
cash grants after many recipients complained that the vouchers were too restrictive.
Among the claims in favour of vouchers is that they are, or could be made to be, self-selecting of 
those in need, if the items that can be obtained with the vouchers are what the wealthy have in abundance 
or simply do not want. To this extent, according to the claim, they should satisfy the Security Difference 
Principle. Some have even argued that there should be a stigma attached to receipt of vouchers precisely to 
increase the self-selectivity of the poor. This seems bizarre and unpalatable.
Claims in favour of the popular variant of education vouchers include the obvious one that they 
encourage more people to invest more in their skills and education, and thus obtain better jobs. The implicit 
claim is that they would not do so without the voucher, or would choose badly.
Among the criticisms of vouchers is that they require considerable planning and preparation, and 
require the agreement of local traders to accept the vouchers and a belief among traders that they will be 
compensated by the government or donors when they hand in the vouchers. There have been ample reports 
that shops do not like dealing with vouchers because they involve extra administrative cost and uncertainty.
Another criticism is that vouchers do stigmatise recipients. There is evidence that this is often a real-
ity, and—contrary to the claim that it promotes self-selection—that it leads to non-take up. The acts of ap-
plication and of trading a voucher are visible transactions and signs of poverty or dependency, leading many 
to fail to apply. An extreme case was in the UK, where the government abandoned a special voucher scheme 
for asylum seekers because many of the recipients were being identified by the public and were being ha-
rassed. If vouchers do stigmatise, that can be expected to lead to a lower take-up rate. And there is no reason 
to presume that this will result in self-selection by the poorest and most insecure.
Almost by definition, vouchers are paternalistic, in that they involve a decision by the state (or 
donor) on what it considers people should be spending money. However benevolent and well-meaning, 
that is undeniably a restriction of individual liberty. A related argument about the specific, and increasingly 
used, case of education vouchers is that it over-emphasises ‘human capital’ rather than broad education. And 
paternalism is inherent to vouchers. This is perhaps why the best form seems to have been ‘seed vouchers’ 
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choose from among a large range of seeds. There have been reports that such seed fairs have worked quite 
well in various parts of Africa.
Any subsidy tends to distort spending patterns, whether by design or not. Food stamps or vouchers 
have been found to result in people spending more on food than they would do if they received the equiva-
lent in cash. Extensive research has found this to be the case in the USA with its food stamps programme. 
Given the high incidence of obesity among the US poor, that in itself would be a reason to convert the 
voucher scheme into a cash transfer. The latter would not ensure that it was spent on healthier food or other 
items, but there would be a lower probability that it would be spent on excessive food. How it would be 
spent would be a matter of individual freedom.
In sum, vouchers are an intermediate form of social protection, steering people to purchase what 
policymakers think they and their communities need, and implicitly steering them away from spending on 
what they would acquire themselves if left to make their own decisions on their needs. They may satisfy the 
Dignified Work Principle, in that they may boost agricultural employment or local schools. But even that 
positive effect would depend on the elasticity of supply of those goods and services. Vouchers may simply 
result in inflationary pressure and lower quality services, while not satisfying any of the policy principles 
outlined earlier.
Conditional Cash Transfers
Remarkably, as noted at the outset, until recently the idea of providing cash transfers as a means of reducing 
poverty in developing countries was dismissed and rarely used even as part of international aid in times of 
emergency. For instance, a review of all UN consolidated aid appeals in 2004 found almost no use of cash or 
vouchers; the appeals were dominated by traditional humanitarian responses, such as food aid, materials for 
shelter, clothing, seeds and so on.
However, there is a growing movement in favour of introducing cash transfers and even universal 
income grants, even in developing countries where it is commonly claimed that no universal system of social 
protection is financially feasible. This enhanced respectability has included interest within the UNDP, ILO, 
the WFP, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Bank, among other international 
bodies, as well as among important bilateral donors, such as the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooper-
ation (SDC), the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, in 
their aid policies towards developing countries.
A conclusion of one review of cash transfer schemes and vouchers was that at present non-govern-
ment and non-UN agencies were more favourably disposed to cash transfers than the UN agencies, adding 
that cash transfers are sometimes seen as threatening to aid agencies, since transparent cash transfers mean 
handing over power, control and responsibility to beneficiaries to decide for themselves (Harvey, 2005). This 
may have been the case, but attitudes are undoubtedly changing.
Even the World Bank has changed its tune. As one of its senior economists, in surveying the empiri-
cal literature, put it:12  DESA Working Paper No. 58
“The conventional wisdom in mainstream development policy circles is that income 
transfers to the poor, and safety net policies more generally, are at best a short term 
palliative and at worst a waste of money. These views are starting to be questioned at 
two levels. Firstly, evidence from careful evaluations has pointed to a number of success 
stories. . . . Secondly, the presumption of an overall trade-off between redistribution or 
insurance (on the one hand) and growth (on the other) has come to be questioned. ” 
(Ravallion, 2003).
Claims in favour of unconditional cash transfers overlap to a certain extent with claims for so-called 
conditional cash transfers. Currently, the latter is the type in vogue. The distinction is not as sharp as is 
sometimes depicted. One reason is that in some cases policymakers and their advisers use conditionality as 
a political device, believing that the attachment of a formal condition is a way of legitimizing the transfer, 
which would otherwise be more opposed by middle-class voters and financial agencies.4 In practice too, the 
difficulty and costs of implementing the criteria used for identifying beneficiaries may lead to merely token 
or discretionary application of the formal conditions. This has been the case of the state old-age pension in 
South Africa, which has been a celebrated success in redistributing income and boosting local small-scale 
economic activities.
Nevertheless, when commentators talk about conditional cash transfers they usually, at present, 
mean a selectivity device that goes beyond conventional means-testing. The most well-known is the require-
ment that recipients should send their children to school. This is a form of paternalism, but it is a modest one 
given that society usually has a constitutional commitment to ensure all children are enrolled in and attend 
school. There are many other forms that are harder to rationalize on ethic or freedom-enhancement grounds.
It is a contention guiding this paper that the growing interest in conditional cash transfers as an aid 
and development tool will lead to a realization that most forms of selectivity and conditionality are conve-
niences at best while being costly, inequitable, inefficient and offensive to basic egalitarian principles. Never-
theless, the current phase of policy development is promising because experimentation with conditional cash 
transfers is proving that they can and do have a beneficial development role. We will come back to uncondi-
tional, universal income transfers at the end.
Whatever the claims and counter-claims, the revival in support for providing the poor and disad-
vantaged with straightforward cash grants has taken off. Examples of experimental schemes are multiplying. 
Humanitarian relief organizations have come to appreciate that their advantages include speed, transparency 
and the ability to allow those in need to make choices about how they spend the aid, thereby enabling them 
to retain a greater sense of dignity in times of crisis (Creti and Jaspars, 2006).
They also have low administrative costs (see box). Based on experience in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, Oxfam has issued guidelines for such schemes, recognizing that they are particularly appropriate 
for socio-economic crises where local purchasing power has been wiped out while food and other basic goods 
are potentially available.
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Cash transfers involve modest costs
The Colombian experience with cash transfers suggests that the costs of distributing them 
are very low. As a World Bank study concluded:
“The cost of SISBEN design and application has been modest in absolute terms (about 
US$0. 21 per person in the registry, US$0. 52 per beneficiary), and relative to the total 
amount of resources that have been targeted with SISBEN. It has been estimated that to 
target US$100 dollars to a beneficiary costs less than 70 US cents. For some programs, 
such as the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT-Familias en Acción), the cost of SISBEN 
is about 0. 5 percent of the total cost of the program (assuming this is the only program 
using SISBEN).” (Castañeda, 2003).
One such scheme that has been particularly carefully evaluated is the Cash for Relief Programme (CfR) in 
Ethiopia. One of its primary objectives was to enable households that had been hit by crop failure to re-
build their assets, so as to restore the basic infrastructural relationships that underpinned the sustainability 
of those communities. The evaluation done for the primary funders of the scheme, USAID, found that the 
cash grants had been very successful in regenerating the livelihoods of people living in the area (Brandsetter, 
2004). Rather than merely consume (which would have been likely with food aid alone), they had controlled 
debts and they had invested in restoring land productivity. The donors found that cash grants
“allowed individuals and communities to begin making a series of decisions, giving them 
the power to prioritise needs for their families and presenting them with a creative way 
to receive relief assistance with dignity. ” (USAID, 2004)
Also in Ethiopia, in the face of annual food crises, Save the Children, a UK-based NGO, has imple-
mented several cash relief projects, and evaluations have concluded that they too have functioned efficiently, 
have been more cost-effective than food aid and have had no inflationary effect (Gebre-Selassie and Beshah, 
2003; Save the Children, UK, 2004; Knox-Peebles, 2001).
Another example is the Emergency Cash Relief Program (ECRP) implemented in a drought-affected 
and politically contested zone of Northeastern Somalia in 2003-04. Some 13,380 socially vulnerable house-
holds, identified as such by an NGO, were each given a one-off US$50. The initial rationale for providing 
direct cash transfers was that it constituted a rapid response to what was an emergency. The programme 
coordinators found that it unblocked the critical economic constraint to livelihood revival.
While there was food available locally, the purchasing power of the local population was extremely 
low and the local credit system was overstretched. What the cash transfers enabled people to do was reduce 
their debts, purchase food and water, and give themselves some sense of ‘empowerment’, resulting in their 
being able to maintain their livelihoods and the complex arrangements of work and social support that 
bound their community together. Without the income grant, work and the community would probably have 
collapsed altogether.
The targeting used in the ECRP was complex—the formal conditions for entitlement being that the 
person should be a destitute pastoralist and belong to a “structurally vulnerable group” (with priority being 
given to women, minorities, elderly, disabled, and members of large families). Village Relief Committees 
were in charge of identifying suitable beneficiaries. Each of those conditions no doubt had some anomalies. 14  DESA Working Paper No. 58
But, crucially, the coordinators found that the overhead costs were comparatively low—17 per cent of total 
costs compared with 25-35 per cent for other, commodity-based relief interventions. The conclusion was 
that the cash transfer scheme functioned relatively effectively. In our terms, it helped generate work and 
economic security in very difficult circumstances.
Another example is the Meket Livelihood Development Pilot Project involving cash transfers provided 
in two areas of Ethiopia in 2001-2004. In the evaluation carried out for Save the Children, it was found 
that the cost of implementing the scheme was much less than the equivalent for food aid schemes (Kebede, 
2005). The latter had substantial transaction costs for beneficiaries (which are rarely taken into account in 
monitoring and evaluation analyses). For instance, because recipients had to share food aid, they had to work 
out how to share, which resulted in time and food being wasted in the course of exchanges of food items be-
tween households wanting one and not another item; the work time involved was also considerable, includ-
ing the cost of waiting for deliveries and for loading and transporting.
By contrast, simple cash transfers allowed the beneficiaries to make strategic choices for themselves. 
The evaluation observed that not only did the cash transfers allow households to build up assets, notably 
through the acquisition of livestock, but they also enabled many households to reduce the distress renting 
out of land. Indeed, among the benefits were that they enabled recipients to obtain higher crop prices, partly 
because it allowed them to sell when prices were more favourable, rather than when they were desperate for 
cash. This is a classic advantage of basic economic security. They also helped some recipients to pay off debts, 
others to pool savings in an equb (group saving scheme) and others to buy seeds, sheep or goats, thereby 
enabling them to work.
Another advantage of the cash transfers was that they enabled more people to work locally, reducing 
the pressure to migrate temporarily in search of cash income. In doing so, it also had a positive impact on 
the children, allowing adults more time at home to care for them and strengthening the parents’ moral pres-
sure on them to attend school. This is surely a powerful development advantage of cash transfers.
Another successful example is the pilot Kalomo Social Cash Transfer Scheme initiated by the Zambian 
Government with financial support from the German development agency GTZ in two districts of Zambia. 
The regular cash transfer was unconditional, in that it did not require recipients to spend the money in any par-
ticular way, thus enabling beneficiaries to have a sense of autonomy on how they spent the cash grant. But it was 
targeted in being means-tested. Beneficiaries were selected by local Community Welfare Assistance Committees, 
in which a participatory method was used to identify the poorest 10 per cent of households, by means of a hun-
ger poverty line. So, it involved a sort of hunger poverty test, and was not wholly unconditional. But crucially 
the selectivity was based on a Voice mechanism, i.e., involvement of a body representing the community.
It also tried to differentiate households by whether or not they consisted of members who were 
unable to work or who were excluded from other poverty schemes, such as the food-for-work scheme. It 
focused on giving cash transfers to the most ‘labour-constrained’ households, setting up bank accounts for 
those in most critical need, and providing a modest grant for each household ($8 per month if the household 
had children, $6 otherwise).
Those operating the scheme have claimed that the money was spent on basic consumption goods 
and education and healthcare for family members (Schubert, 2005). In other words, it showed that people 
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that a majority of the beneficiary households were headed by elderly persons or women, about half of the 
households were AIDS-affected, and nearly half contained orphans. And, as with other schemes of this sort, 
it was evident that when women, rather than men, controlled the transfers they were more likely to spend a 
large part of them on their children and their family.
The Zambian scheme had a more general message. It has been estimated that if it were scaled up 
to reach the poorest 10 per cent of all Zambian households the cost would amount to merely 5 per cent of 
the total overseas aid to the country, or about 0. 5 per cent of its Gross National Income. In other words, 
a national scheme is financially feasible. It would be much cheaper than the country’s food aid, and would 
have the advantage of going directly to the poor and vulnerable, without the high administrative costs and 
various forms of corruption associated with commodity-based schemes. And whereas food aid damages local 
food markets, by deterring local producers, cash transfers would do the opposite by helping to stimulate local 
markets. In Zambia, no less than 70 per cent of all social transfers are spent on locally produced goods and 
services, thus generating local employment or livelihoods (DFID, 2006; Samson and others, 2006).
Cash grants in Africa
“Childcare grants, disability allowances, pensions and other direct transfers of cash can be used even in 
countries with poor infrastructure, little capacity to deliver services or no interest in reform. ”
—Commission for Africa Report, 2005.
The Zambian, Ethiopian and Somalian cash transfer experiences offer encouraging evidence that they are 
affordable and are conducive to livelihood revival in chronically poor areas. In times of emergency, cash 
grants should not be seen as pure alternatives to other forms of commodity-based aid. Such transfers might 
be inflationary if local food supplies are not available, and this may mean that in the initial aftermath of a di-
saster, particularly a quick-onset disaster, food aid should complement cash transfers, to restrain inflationary 
pressures, with direct commodity aid being gradually faded out as local producers respond to the increased 
demand for staple goods and services. Cash transfers need complementary programmes designed to boost lo-
cal supply, as was found to be the case following the Mozambique floods a few years ago (Abt Associates Inc., 
2002).
Following those floods, USAID funded cash grants of about US$92 for 106,280 flood-affected rural fami-
lies. Implemented by a private firm, recipients were issued with cheques at local sites, while a commercial 
bank provided tellers who were able to cash the cheques, all protected by a local security firm. The outcome 
has important lessons. An impact evaluation found that most of the money was spent on local goods and 
services, which stimulated the local economy, regenerating livelihoods in a sustainable way(Abt Associates 
Inc., 2002; Christie and Hanlon, 2001; Hanlon, 2004).
Such schemes have not only been taking place in Africa. Among the growing number that have been 
launched outside Africa as part of emergency and rehabilitation programmes funded by foreign donors is the 
Cash for Herder scheme in Mongolia, implemented by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
and the Red Cross in 2003. The evaluation two years later found that while another in-kind project that they 
had operated was “appreciated” by recipients, it had not helped regenerate the local economy, whereas the 
cash transfer had led to investment in assets that regenerated their livelihoods.16  DESA Working Paper No. 58
The evaluation concluded,
“The cash approach made use of the creativity and experience of beneficiary families 
to develop strategies out of their crisis…[It] showed that poor people and people under 
severe economic stress are very well capable to handle cash responsibly and develop and 
take strategic decisions on what to spend the money in order to improve the livelihood 
and their families in the medium and long term…. . most important, beneficiaries do 
become economic and social actors in their own community again, taking their decisions 
on how to spend the money” (SDC-IFRC, 2005).
The evaluation found additional advantages, in that “the response and preparation time” was short, 
and the administrative overheads were low. These advantages can be considerable for hard-pressed officials 
running such schemes.
By 2005, the SDC had implemented 13 cash grant projects of this type in eight countries, including 
such difficult places as Ingushetia and Mongolia. Its assessments have been sufficiently favourable to make the 
SDC continue to rely on them. But it is not alone. In the past few years, the US Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (OFDA), which long regarded cash transfers as out of the question, has provided quite substantial 
funds for cash grants in various countries, including its scheme in Ethiopia in 2003.
Tellingly, the growing legitimacy of simple cash transfers was reflected in the G8 Statement of 2004, 
which, when referring to the international response to famines, made the commitment,
“We will unleash the power of markets through cash-for-work and cash-for-relief pro-
grams.” (G8 Statement, 2004)
Thus the scope for cash transfers in Africa and Asia is recognized, becoming a significant part of 
non-contributory social protection and a means of enhancing work opportunities. Meanwhile, in Latin 
America, cash transfers have become a central part of social and development policy. As considered in the next 
section, the main type of scheme has been targeted on families with school-age children.
Incomes-for-school attendance and child benefits
One form of conditional cash transfer that has become enormously popular in the past decade or so is a form 
of family allowance, a monthly sum of money paid to families, or more usually to mothers, on condition 
that their children attend school. Obviously, the starting point of this type of scheme is that it is targeted at a 
particular social group, women with children of school-going age, a group perceived as likely to be poor and/
or economically insecure. But such income-for-school-attendance schemes should be distinguished from stan-
dard family allowances and from the means-tested Child Support Grant as introduced in South Africa in 1998.
In general, such schemes appear attractive for several reasons. The main claim is that they lower the 
poverty and economic insecurity of women and lower child poverty. It is hard to dispute this. By the same 
token, it is claimed that they reduce child malnutrition, as well as promote child school enrolment and 
school attendance. It is also obviously less paternalistic than food parcels and food aid, or other commodity-
based forms of transfer to the poor. It is also a means of redistributing income that is relatively easily legiti-
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However, such schemes are subject to several criticisms. One is that they focus on one particular 
group to the neglect of other groups of deserving poor. By focusing only on school-age children they neglect 
families with children under the age of seven, which is the group most at risk of ill-health due to malnutri-
tion and impoverishment. As such, they raise questions about the equity of that selectivity. A second claim is 
that, by giving to young women, they discourage female labour force participation. A third claim is that they 
involve a high administrative cost, particularly as they are means-tested.
These criticisms have been swept aside for the moment. Country after country has opted for this 
policy. The main examples are in central and south America, starting in Mexico, where the original pro-
gresa (literally ‘progressing’) scheme, introduced in 1992, has evolved into the Oportunidades scheme. 5 The 
progresa was supposed to support school-age children in poor households in marginalized rural communities, 
but in 2002 Oportunidades extended that aid to other rural and urban areas.
The Mexican scheme has evolved into a complex mechanism of social engineering. The cash trans-
fer actually consists of three components—a household nutrition allowance, a schooling subsidy for each 
school-age child that rises in amount by grade and that is higher for girls of secondary school age, and an 
annual payment to cover the cost of books and uniforms. This makes the scheme quite complex. To com-
plete the social engineering function, the amount of cash transfer that any household can receive is capped, 
one intention being to avoid giving families an incentive to have more children, another being to reduce 
what the policymakers think might be ‘benefit dependence’. To receive the transfers, children must maintain 
a school attendance record of 85 per cent , while mothers and children must have regular medical checks and 
parents must attend ‘parenting classes’.
The targeting takes place via a two-stage process. First, poor geographical areas are identified, with 
existing health, schooling and transport infrastructure; second, poorer households in those areas are identi-
fied via use of a proxy index of poverty (using indicators of housing, health, and schooling, which are taken 
to indicate vulnerability to poverty). As a result of this procedure, about three million Mexican households 
are reached at any one time.
Although awkward questions remain about the efficiency and equity of the selectivity process, 
Progresa has been legitimized. It has been shown to be less expensive to distribute than food aid (Gertler, 
2005). Above all it has been shown to have reduced poverty in recipient households and to have resulted in 
increased school enrolment and attendance, as well as improved health in beneficiary households (Skoufias, 
2001). Its successor scheme can be expected to do much the same. In short, the Mexican scheme has become 
a central part of the country’s social protection system.
The other major example is Brazil’s Bolsa familia (‘family stipend’), set up in 2001. This has become 
the flagship of Brazil’s cash transfer schemes, and undoubtedly contributed to President Lula’s re-election 
in October 2006. It evolved from a series of localized schemes introduced in urban areas during the 1990s. 
Among the precursors were the PETI (Programme for the Eradication of Child Labour), introduced in 
1996 in coalmining areas, then sugar cane and sisal production areas, and then extended to all areas in 
1999. Various forms of bolsa escola (‘school stipend’) and renda minima schemes spread in the late 1990s, 
and these became a federal programme in 2001, which reached over eight million children in five million 
households by 2003. In 2004, four income transfer schemes, including the bolsa escola, were consolidated 
into the Bolsa Familia.
5  The original scheme was called the programme for education, health and nutrition, symbolizing its multiple objectives.18  DESA Working Paper No. 58
That became a central part of the Lula Government’s Zero Fome (Zero Hunger) campaign, and has 
been seen as a way of reducing the country’s enormous income inequality. It has also unified a variety of 
more paternalistic and selective schemes, such as the gas allowance and school stipends. An intention has 
been to break the inter-generational transfer of poverty by conditioning access to the transfers on key human 
development objectives (schooling, nutrition and health). It is also seen as a means of ‘empowering’ women, 
giving them more bargaining power in their households and enabling them to make decisions on their chil-
dren’s education and on their own work.
By 2006, the bolsa familia was reaching over 11 million households living below the official poverty 
line, or over 44 million people. The scheme is nominally means-tested, with the transfer amount being deter-
mined by number of children in the household. Autonomy is granted in the sense that recipients can choose 
how to spend the money, but the conditionalities (‘incentives’, so-called) are restraining, and include school 
attendance by children aged 5-15, anti-natal classes for pregnant women, and vaccination for children under 
the age of seven.
The bolsa familia has generated enormous global interest. Although a comprehensive evaluation by 
the Ministry of Social Development had yet to be completed by early 2007, the scheme has been particularly 
beneficial for those lacking access to income-earning employment. Already there have been a series of evalu-
ations and monitoring research projects. Some have been critical, but most have been favourable (see Britto, 
2005; Fonseca, 2005, inter alia). The consensus is that the cash transfers have reduced female poverty, in-
creased school attendance and learning performance in school, and apparently led to increased female labour 
force participation. Indeed, one study of the earlier scheme concluded,
“Instead of the expected negative correlation between bolsa escola and work, we find the opposite: those 
receiving the stipend are the ones that work more.” (Schwartzman, 2005)
The effect on child labour is more nuanced, since it seems to have resulted in children doing fewer 
hours of labour but not necessarily stopping it altogether (Cardoso and Souza, 2003; Rocha, 2000). This is 
partly because prohibiting child labour is not a formal part of the programme. Child labour has continued 
to play a significant role in the subsistence survival of poor households in rural areas and urban slums, ac-
counting for over 20 per cent of family income in about a third of all families. The stipend is too modest to 
displace that contribution.
The Brazilian scheme is well-established, in spite of criticisms of its design. In Latin America, at 
least, it seems the way to move cash transfers up the policy ladder. Other schemes similar in type to Progresa 
and Bolsa Familia are Colombia’s Familias en Accion, Honduras’ Programa de Asignacion Familiar (PRAF), 
Jamaica’s Programme of Advancement through Health and Education (PATH) and Nicaragua’s Red de Proteccion 
Social (RPS), which predated the Brazilian model by becoming operational in 2000.
Outside Latin America and the Caribbean, there is growing interest, and the beacon is Bangladesh’s 
Cash for Education scheme. Three aspects of such societies are holding back the appeal of this type of cash 
transfer. The lack of a proper registration system is often one of them. Operating a means-tested conditional 
scheme of the scope and complexity of an income-for-school attendance is daunting in a low-income society. 
And often pushing more young children into school is not practical in the short term.
More generally, to what extent does this type of scheme satisfy the Policy Decision Principles enun-
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nalistic. Probably most observers would accept that it is desirable to impose conditions that benefit children, 
and would be satisfied with that as long as the scheme did not put families into some kind of poverty trap.
The Mexican scheme, for instance, does seem to go much further than that, and raises questions 
about the possibility of excessive bureaucratic intervention in family life of an intrusive kind that would lead 
to stigma and even non-application for the cash transfer. The Brazilian scheme may be less intrusive, and to 
the extent that there is a political commitment to weaken the conditionality rather than to increase it, the 
bolsa familia may offer a better prospect of avoiding becoming too paternalistic and a vehicle for invasive 
social engineering. And one may choose to believe that this is actually desirable.
As far as the Security Difference principle is concerned, the very complexity of the targeting proce-
dure described above must raise questions about horizontal efficiency and the omission of many households 
that are among the poorest in rural and urban Mexico. There is also the reality of a poverty trap if house-
holds would lose entitlement to the benefit if they were to move out of poverty, thus discouraging work and 
modest social mobility. More evidence is needed on this.
As far as targeting is concerned, research has suggested that the Progresa in Mexico was quite effec-
tive in reaching very poor households in very poor areas, but was less effective in reaching the ‘moderately 
poor’ (Skoufias, 2001, p. 43). To that extent, it could be said to have satisfied the Security Difference Prin-
ciple in being ‘horizontally efficient’. But in all schemes of this type, conspicuously excluded from coverage 
are households with only pre-school age children and all impoverished households without any children, as 
well as orphans and others living outside family households altogether. As such, one cannot claim that the 
targeting reaches the most impoverished in society. There is also evidence that they do reach many others. In 
both Nicaragua and Mexico, it was found that about 20 per cent of the beneficiaries were non-poor (Coady, 
Grosh and Hoddinnott, 2004). In Bangladesh, where targeting has been much weaker, about 40 per cent of 
beneficiaries have been found to be non-poor. Given that the targeting is supposed to exclude the non-poor 
this suggests that none of the schemes has been that successful on its own criterion. Whether or not they 
should be concerned to achieve such ‘efficiency’ is another matter.
Hidden in the design of such schemes is a presumption about registration. They require a sophisti-
cated and updated system. In Brazil, where the rapidity of the roll-out of the bolsa familia was impressive, 
much depended on the judgment one makes about the efficiency of the Federal Government’s registration 
procedures (based on Registration Administration Records). Those households not registered cannot partici-
pate in the scheme and cannot obtain benefits. Even if the registration scheme were efficient, the registration 
condition would surely be very likely to result in the denial of benefits to a great many families that are poor 
and economically insecure. Besides that, the economically insecure tend to have incomes that fluctuate above 
and below any imaginable poverty line, making it a bit of a lottery whether or not they manage to qualify.
To succeed in the broader social aims, this type of conditional income scheme depends on there 
being adequate local schooling and health and transport infrastructure. In urban areas of Latin America and 
the Caribbean, these may exist to a sufficient degree. In rural areas of those countries, and in large parts of 
Africa and Asia, the imposition of school-attendance and clinic-attendance conditions may impose onerous 
burdens on poor households, and actually hit the very poor more than anybody else.
Even in Latin America, some observers have questioned the desirability of the extensive conditional-
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leading policymakers to conclude that a move towards less conditionality would be a more efficient and equi-
table way to go. The very complexity of requiring potential beneficiaries to prove they are poor and vulner-
able, and to demonstrate regular attendance in schools and clinics (or to prove that they had a valid reason 
for not doing so) is surely off-putting for people cowed by poverty and chronic insecurity. It is also clearly 
expensive in administrative time and paperwork (Ayala Consulting, 2003).
The biggest question is one at the heart of all debates on social protection in the 21st century. Some 
observers ask whether or not all the conditions are necessary if the objective is to promote human develop-
ment and if those conditions simply require people to do what is in their best interest. Does the state or 
some agency know what that is? Obliging a mother to send a child to school might seem obviously benefi-
cial, but the pressure to do so—and the fear of income loss if she does not—may lead to a perverse outcome 
of a mother sending a sick child to school, to the longer-term detriment of the child and the family. One can 
think of many other personal circumstances that should cause disquiet.
The fact is that the imposition of conditions for entitlement presumes that a poor person is irratio-
nal or incapable of learning, does not know his or her long-term interests, lacks information or cannot or 
will not act in the child’s longer-term interest because of some impediment. Dealing with those issues di-
rectly would surely be more successful than imposing behavioural conditions that eat up public resources in 
administering them, while perhaps ignoring the structural factors that impede seemingly rational behaviour. 
Even in the case of children, one cannot accept state paternalism uncritically.
This concern is one that may come to preoccupy the second-generation reformers as assessments 
of income-for-school attendance schemes unfold. What is clear is that they are perfectly compatible with 
more independent economic activity. The Dignified Work Principle seems to be supported by the fact that 
women’s labour force participation has been boosted by such schemes. That in itself is encouraging, because 
it stands in opposition to those who claim that cash transfers foster ‘dependency’. That is simple prejudice.
Social pensions
If Latin America has been the continent leading the way with cash transfers for the young, Africa has been 
the region of the world where non-contributory cash transfers at the other end of the age spectrum have 
been gaining most ground.
Africa is not alone in that regard. With global ‘ageing’ and with the social dislocation of families that 
is pushing a lot more elderly people out of family-based support networks, the form of social protection that 
has perhaps gained most support and credibility is what is called a social pension. HelpAge International has 
been at the forefront of a campaign to legitimize this, and one could argue that a social pension is the only 
feasible way of meeting the commitment made by governments in 2002 in the Madrid International Plan of 
Action of Ageing to halve the number of elderly people in extreme poverty by 2015.
In many developing countries, there is some sort of means-tested state pension, but more interesting 
is the non-means-tested variety, that is, a basic universal state pension provided to all citizens above a certain 
age without prior conditions, such as a record of contributions, being required to gain entitlement. 6 It is 
sometimes depicted as a primary pillar of a multi-pillar pension system. The interest arises not just because it 
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offers the prospect of cutting old-age poverty quite dramatically but because it may be a productive investment 
as well, directly and indirectly boosting dignified work and livelihoods.
It seems somewhat ironic that social pensions have been pioneered in a few developing countries 
where poverty and inequality are rife and where many economists would say that there are not the resources 
available to pay for such schemes. Variants exist in South Africa, Namibia, Nepal and Mauritius, where the 
amount paid rises with the age of the pensioner, and Botswana, Bolivia, Samoa, rural areas of Brazil and 
Lesotho, which introduced it in 2004 for those over the age of 70. The NOAPS in India (National Old Age 
Pension Scheme) is tending towards being a social pension as well, albeit giving a very small amount and 
with notorious inefficiency. A country that has brought in a scheme recently is Chile, its Government tak-
ing advantage of a surge in foreign exchange earnings due to the rising price of copper to spend on a basic 
pension. In addition, by 2007 over 30 other developing countries and transition countries were operating 
means-tested, non-contributory pensions (Johnson and Williamson, 2006).
Besides enhancing old-age income security, social pensions are potentially significant instruments for 
influencing the patterns of work and labour in society. The primary claim in favour of the non-means-tested 
variant is that it is universal and rights-based—all citizens above a certain age are entitled to receive a month-
ly cash transfer. Advocates point out that social pensions reduce old-age poverty better than any alternative, 
are redistributive, affordable and transparent, while having very low administrative costs. They typically ac-
count for a very small percentage of GDP; in Costa Rica, for example, they took only 0. 3 per cent in 1999, 
and in Zimbabwe only 0. 1 per cent (Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott, 2004; Munro, 2003). Another strong 
empirical finding is that the South African pension has been the only successful redistributive social policy in 
the post-apartheid era (Case and Deaton, 1998).
It is still often claimed that such schemes are costly precisely because they are universal. The main 
response to that is that by being universal they reach nearly all the elderly, and do so remarkably cheaply. It 
falls to Namibia to have the simplest and most efficient social pension, operated via an electronic card and 
biometric identification of claimants. Each month, vans go to the numerous villages and urban payment 
spots, each van containing cash dispensing machines and computers. The pensioners (or designated surrogates 
if the pensioner is too ill or frail to go) present their cards at the van and are paid the equivalent of US$30 
(as of 2006). The take-up rate is close to 90 per cent , which is remarkably high by comparison with all other 
pension schemes in developing countries, and is higher than any means-tested scheme operating anywhere.
The scheme in Namibia is administered by a private company on contract to the Government. The 
costs are equivalent to about 30 US cents per person per month, also remarkably low by comparison with other 
systems. To counter the possibility of fraudulent claims made on behalf of dead people, the authorities inge-
niously introduced a burial insurance scheme within the pension; the pensioner, on registering to receive the 
pension, takes out a mandatory life insurance, whereby funeral costs are covered when he or she dies; applica-
tion for the burial funds enables the authorities to cancel the card at the same time. Given the symbolic signifi-
cance of decent burials and their cost, the insurance scheme has been found to be very successful in all respects.
Also remarkable, which relates to the Dignified Work Principle, is the effect on work and livelihoods. 
In this regard, social pensions have proven very effective, in that they have helped preserve family structures, 
enabled grandparents to pay for the schooling of grandchildren, paid for the care of family members suffer-
ing from HIV/AIDS, made the elderly creditworthy and promoted sustainable livelihoods, particularly in 
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Too many economists have simply failed to appreciate that social pensions are productive. In this, 
they have forgotten a lesson from European history, which is that old-age security acted as a powerful force 
in modernizing agriculture, precisely because it led to more risk-taking innovation. But enhanced old-age 
security has also been shown to do so in rural areas of Brazil. As one study concluded,
“The regularity, certainty and liquidity of pension benefits meant that they played a key 
role in shifting households from subsistence to surplus agriculture. ” (Barrientos and 
Lloyd-Sherlock, 2002: 17)7
Besides its consistency with the Dignified Work Principle, the social pension is relatively 
likely to satisfy the Security Difference Principle if it takes the non-means-tested form. 
Being universalistic, in that it provides for all those beyond a certain age (albeit a very 
high age as in the case of Nepal), it should reach all the poor in that age group. It is also 
paid to individuals, thus satisfying a universalistic concern. It is also non-paternalistic, 
in that it allows the beneficiary to spend on what he or she chooses, and is conveyed as 
a right rather than a discretionary matter of charity. In brief, it is a feasible first step in 
the direction of a universal right to income security, which has been shown to promote 
livelihoods and personal development.
Again, a prejudiced view about cash transfers is beginning to lose its force. Contrary to the conve-
nient view of all elites throughout history, providing the poor, even the elderly, with a little income security 
does not promote idleness and ‘dependency’. It fosters a sense of independence and boosts dignified work, in 
part enabling the elderly to carry out work with some access to financial assets, in part enabling the elderly to 
pay for care, and in part enabling those able and fit enough to do so to provide care for younger relatives and 
the sick.
The debate on whether a basic state pension should be universalistic or means-tested is rumbling on. 
The signs are that the universalistic variant is gaining ground. In 2007, South Africa was just one country 
in which the pressure was growing to end the residual use of means-testing in its social pension. There and 
elsewhere in Africa, the IMF and other financial agencies have been trying to move governments in the other 
direction—including Namibia. But the evidence that this would be sensible from an equity or efficiency 
point of view is simply not there.
Disability grants
Another form of targeted, selective income transfer is what is known as the disability grant. Here we will deal 
with a particular variant, as introduced in southern Africa, in Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia and South 
Africa. This is an income transfer that is both means-tested and work-tested. As operated in the region, it 
is not the most brilliant piece of social policy devised to give social protection, enhance the well-being of 
recipients or promote decent work.
The leading scheme has been that operated in South Africa. A permanent grant is supposed to be 
available to anyone with a disability that is expected to last for more than a year, a temporary grant is sup-
posed to be given to anyone with a recognized disability expected to last between six and twelve months. If 
a person deemed disabled is below the age of 18, they can obtain a care dependency grant instead. Access to 
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either is based on a complex means test, based on an assets value test and an earned income test; there is also a 
joint assets test, since for married couples the joint assets must be less than a designated amount to entitle the 
person to a grant. But the conditionality does not stop with those means tests, since the scheme also requires 
applicants to demonstrate a medical condition and an incapacity to work. It is this cocktail of tests that pro-
vides a recipe for a social disaster.
Before considering the reasons for this conclusion, note that in Namibia, although the social pen-
sion (a basic income for the elderly) has been the pillar propping up many small communities, a disability 
grant modelled on the South African scheme has been growing in significance. In the context of the HIV/
AIDS pandemic, the disability grant there has already become the country’s second most prevalent income 
support mechanism. The disability grant is part of an evolving system of selective, targeted cash transfers in 
Namibia, which also include three family benefits—the foster parent grant, the child maintenance grant and 
the orphan’s grant. So far, only a few households are receiving any of those. All are means-tested, and thus 
involve poverty traps and the conventional moral hazards that come with all means-tested schemes.
Being means-tested, it is scarcely surprising that in Namibia the disability grant reaches no more than 
about 20 per cent of all those who should be reached, according to Census figures for the number of people suf-
fering from a chronic physical or mental impairment. 8 It is moot whether it reaches many of the AIDS victims, 
many of whom become disabled as the sickness intensifies. The trouble is that if it does not reach them, treat-
ment with anti-retrovirals (ARVs) will fail since unless a person can eat reasonably well the medication will not 
work. However, if it were to reach a large proportion of the AIDS victims the fiscal cost would be large.
The immediate problem, however, is the conditionality attached to the disability grant. To be en-
titled, a person must obtain a doctor’s certificate stating that he or she is not only disabled but also unable 
to work in income-earning activity. The rule has been that those with a CD4 count—a measurement of the 
body’s immunity—that has fallen to below a value of 200 are entitled to a temporary disability grant, if they 
pass those means tests. They are supposed to de-register if their CD4 count improves to above 200 due to 
anti-retrovirals. Because of this, coupled with the nature of the ARV roll out, in Namibia as in South Africa, 
a bizarre “sickness poverty trap” has been created.
In those areas where the roll out of ARVs is operating thus far, if an AIDS victim has a sufficiently 
severe sickness level, he or she qualifies for treatment. Most of the recipients are wretchedly poor. So, it 
should not be surprising that two tendencies have emerged. Some of those receiving ARVs have been sharing 
their pills with relatives and friends who are not quite sick enough to qualify. Taking half the dose does not 
slow down the rate of recovery from the disease; it merely makes the treatment ineffectual, if not building up 
resistance to the treatment.
Second, those who are poor who receive ARVs have been prone to go one stage further—they have 
been selling the pills. In Namibia, some have been selling them over the border in Angola. The need for food 
to survive in the short term overrides the need for health to survive in the longer term. Thus, the ARV roll 
out is likely to fail because it is not linked to income security.
Third, even more ironically, the work capacity test for eligibility for the disability grant is creating 
a unique moral hazard. If the ARV treatment begins to improve the physical and social condition of the 
patient, so the capacity to work improves. If it does, the doctor is supposed to indicate that the person can 
8  For a review of the evidence, see Standing (2006).24  DESA Working Paper No. 58
work, which means he or she would lose entitlement to the benefit. This creates a rather sordid dilemma. 
The benefit is needed to ensure the person can have an adequate diet to enable ARVs to work!
So, there should be no surprise that already, in Namibia and in South Africa, there are credible an-
ecdotal reports that people are stopping ARV treatment in order to push themselves back below the physical 
capacity-for-work level, for fear of losing the grant.9 According to the Treatment Action Campaign, which 
has been advocating a universal basic income instead, there have been many instances in which patients have 
simply refused treatment for fear of losing their disability grant.
There is also a new more menacing fear involving a yo-yo effect, in which sick individuals take treat-
ment for a while, see their health improve slightly, stop until it worsens, start again, stop again, and so on. 
This, it is widely believed, is contributing to the development of treatment-resistant strains of the disease. If 
true, this would be the ultimate moral hazard—people dying of a disease opting to put themselves back into 
that category because they need to survive.
The disability grant as it has operated in South Africa and Namibia must rank as one of the worst de-
signed cash transfer schemes in the world. It is unlikely to satisfy any of the policy principles outlined earlier.
The poverty traps and moral hazards are evident. If the grants are provided only for the foster parent 
or single parent who is classified as “poor”, they will encourage those on the margin of poverty to conceal 
their earned income or not to try to move above the nominal poverty line. This is particularly relevant when 
in any case incomes typically fluctuate erratically above and below the “poverty line” used for the means 
tests. Indeed, determining eligibility is often fairly random, so that some who usually have a below-poverty 
income might not qualify, while others who usually above it but not when asked would receive the benefit. 
Procedural delays are also likely to be long, so if a household fell into poverty or if it had lost entitlement it is 
likely to take many months of ‘queuing’ for consideration before entitlement could be gained or re-gained.
The disability grant also fails the Security Difference Principle because it effectively gives less to 
women than to men, because women’s needs linked to disability tend to be greater, while the grants given are 
the same for men and women (Goldblatt, 2007). There is also ample anecdotal evidence that the administra-
tive procedures reduce the take-up rate most among the most deprived and most badly incapacitated.
In short, the disability grant as it has operated in southern Africa is a classic case of how a combina-
tion of means-testing and behaviour-testing can achieve precisely the opposite of what policymakers intend. 
Surely, enough is known to scrap the work test and the means test in disability grants.
A contrast with those selective conditional cash transfer schemes is shown by what was implemented 
in Mozambique in the early 1990s following the country’s civil war. The government introduced a simple un-
conditional cash transfer scheme for those disabled or displaced known as GAPVU, or ‘cash payments to war-
displaced urban destitute households programme’. This reached about 16 per cent of urban households, and 
raised average household incomes by as much as 40 per cent , significantly reducing poverty (Devereux and 
others, 2005; DFID, 2005; Samson and others, 2006). But it also helped boost small-scale employment and 
the livelihoods of the urban poor, having a notable effect on food production and trading activity. The pro-
gramme had a means test, but the authorities largely ignored it, which contributed to the programme’s success.
9  On the situation in South Africa, see Nattrass (2006a; 2006b).How Cash Transfers Boost Work and Economic Security          25
The main point of relevance is that the transfer helped to boost informal productive work. This is 
what a good income security scheme should do, not by obligations but by giving security in which rational 
choices can be made.
Why targeting and conditionalities will fade
Selectivity, targeting and conditionality go together with the notion of “the deserving poor” and with its opposite 
“the undeserving poor”. But that distinction has always been arbitrary, as well as subjective. The principal way of 
making it during the 20th century was usually some measure of the capacity to labour, coupled with the idea of 
contingency risk against which a wage worker could be insured, such as “involuntary” unemployment, sickness, 
work accidents, maternity and old age. A person deemed capable of working in the labour market was deserv-
ing of income support if he (or less often she) had a misfortune deemed to be beyond his or her ‘fault’.
Put those ideas together with the idealised notion of the nuclear family, consisting of workers 
(“breadwinners”) and dependants, and a simple model for social protection emerges. Basically, under this 
model, the state or some surrogate for it provides compensation for adverse outcomes to contingency risks 
for those who are adequately insured and it gives charitably to those in need who are deemed incapable of 
labouring. Underlying that is the notion of social solidarity, based on reciprocity.
In the globalisation era, that model, always highly dubious as a generalisation, breaks down irretriev-
ably. All aspects fragment—family structures, stable full-time employment from which to make contribu-
tions to social insurance, the nature of risk exposure, the distinction between ‘breadwinners’ and ‘depen-
dants’, notions of disability, the structural basis of social solidarity, and so on.
The old dualistic model has broken down, and yet still policy designers act as if it was operational or 
as if they believe it will be restored. The resultant intellectual confusion is tragic.
In industrialised affluent countries, the reaction has been to redefine the distinction between deserv-
ing and undeserving, and to extend the boundary for defining those capable of labour. Those who fall into 
a state of ‘need’ (poverty) are deemed to be either culpable in some sense or in ‘need’ of assistance to return 
them to the mainstream of society, capable of labour. The result is a mix of means-testing and behaviour-
testing, coupled with a drift towards social therapy. But this moralistic drift is profoundly disturbing since far 
from reviving the vital sense of social solidarity and universal citizenship, it divides society into saints and 
sinners. It has been tried before, and it has failed.
In the context of globalisation, there is a counter-movement, and it is being led by what is happen-
ing in developing countries. There the baggage of 20th century social security is light. Politicians and their 
advisers may have received their tertiary education in some rich industrialised country, where they learned 
about ‘welfare state’ policies. But the industrial labour model clearly does not apply. Most people, as workers, 
are outside the ‘formal’ wage labour system, and most importantly the range of risks to which most people 
are exposed do not correspond to the simple contingency risks that underpinned welfare state development.
In particular, communities and individuals are exposed much more to systemic or co-variant risk. It is 
also absurdly arbitrary to make sharp distinctions between the deserving and undeserving in contexts where 
brute ill-luck and chronic uncertainty are the undeniable realities. It is in these contexts that international 
aid and technical assistance is becoming a source of enlightenment. Emergencies, shocks, crises—all force 
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What does that mean? Ultimately, it means not just having food at the end of some dusty road, but 
being able to develop sustainable livelihoods in viable communities based on functioning systems of social 
solidarity. That lesson is being re-learned, and those in civil society organisations are helping to make sure it 
is learned and that the policymakers are being obliged to take note, and reshape their interventions accord-
ingly. It is this that has revived faith in cash transfers, and it is this that is beginning to pose awkward ques-
tions to those wedded to selectivity, targeting and conditionality.
A principal claim in favour of unconditional cash transfers is that being universal it is socially just. 
It is non-labourist, in that it does not presume that some forms of work are deserving of income support and 
other forms not.10 By making all forms of work equally deserving, it helps to promote work, and allows in-
dividuals to make choices between types of work more easily. For that reason, among others, its proponents 
argue, universal cash transfers favour women relative to many forms of social security because each individual 
receives an individual transfer and because those doing non-wage work such as childcare or eldercare are not 
penalized, unlike the case of “labourfare”.
Because a universal, unconditional cash transfer is definitionally a rights-based approach, being 
granted as a citizenship right, it would enhance full freedom. It would also enhance the bargaining position 
of disadvantaged groups, many members of which usually have to accept degrading working conditions and 
low wages because they are desperate. From an economic point of view, the argument is that it would shift 
money into the hands of those most likely to spend on locally-produced goods and services, thus helping to 
boost local demand and employment.
Compared with means-tested social assistance and social insurance schemes, a universal cash transfer 
would remove the infamous poverty trap, whereby someone who raised their earned income just above the 
threshold used to determine eligibility for the cash transfer would lose all their benefit, and the related unem-
ployment trap. As such, proponents believe, it would immeasurably reduce the incidence of moral hazards and 
immoral hazards.
Another reason for believing that sooner or later universal basic income security will emerge as the 
sensible and equitable objective from experience with targeted, conditional cash transfers is that surveys 
in many countries have found that strong majorities of people believe that everybody should have basic 
10  By contrast, “workfare” schemes should be called “labourfare” in that they require individuals (usually unemployed) to 
do designated labour if they wish to gain entitlement to some payment in cash or in kind. The underlying coercion or 
obligation is contrary to any notion of a right to work.
Table 1: 
Support for income security principles, by economic security, Mozambique, 2005
Principle Upper limit Minimum Income Limit differences
Security in main work
Secure 61. 2 81. 1 51. 7
Insecure 60. 9 88. 0 53. 8
Satisfied with income
Satisfied 59. 7 71. 1 37. 5
Not satisfied 59. 4 89. 3 58. 9
Total 58. 6 86. 3 52. 4
Source: Mozambique People’s Security Survey, n = 440.How Cash Transfers Boost Work and Economic Security          27
Table 2: 
Ghana and South Africa: Per cent supporting income principles  













No schooling 38. 7 59. 1 63. 0 22. 4
Primary 32. 7 60. 3 68. 9 21. 6
Secondary 36. 0 60. 2 68. 7 17. 5
Tertiary 40. 4 63. 0 71. 5 16. 1
Sex Male 38. 7 60. 1 68. 4 19. 0
Female 34. 3 60. 2 67. 2 19. 1
Region Urban 30. 8 64. 3 73. 9 11. 8
Rural 40. 9 56. 7 62. 6 25. 0
Income level
0-50,000 34. 8 51. 1 53. 0 24. 2
51,000-100,000 34. 3 54. 5 63. 2 17. 7
101,000-200,000 36. 3 63. 4 70. 5 18. 6
201,000-400,000 37. 6 55. 2 71. 4 24. 8
401,000+ 41. 0 69. 4 69. 7 13. 1
Income for healthcare
More than sufficient 32. 0 60. 4 65. 3 16. 3
About adequate 36. 2 61. 7 69. 4 17. 0
Insufficient 36. 6 59. 2 66. 6 20. 6
Income for food
More than sufficient 42. 6 61. 1 62. 3 15. 4
About adequate 34. 8 60. 6 69. 2 18. 1
Insufficient 36. 5 59. 6 67. 0 20. 8
Total 36. 3 60. 2 67. 7 19. 0
Cape Town, South Africa, 2001
Schooling level
Primary 44. 5 55. 5 60. 5 30. 2
Secondary 42. 2 60. 1 69. 8 26. 4
Tertiary 42. 5 65. 0 77. 5 17. 5
Sex Male 45. 8 57. 4 63. 8 27. 6
Female 42. 2 56. 7 63. 3 29. 7
Region Urban 52. 1 53. 4 58. 3 31. 1
Rural 45. 9 50. 5 58. 7 46. 7
Household income 
1-200 44. 3 47. 6 50. 4 33. 6
201-600 50. 9 56. 9 57. 2 36. 5
601-1600 44. 7 58. 8 70. 4 28. 4
1601+ 44. 2 64. 3 72. 1 17. 2
Income adequacy  
for healthcare
Sufficient 41. 8 50. 3 70. 3 23. 3
Adequate 46. 0 60. 7 63. 8 32. 8
Insufficient 41. 8 55. 4 60. 4 26. 3
Income adequacy 
for food
Sufficient 40. 3 53. 1 69. 4 23. 7
Adequate 45. 8 61. 1 63. 5 31. 2
Insufficient 42. 7 53. 5 60. 1 28. 4
Total 43. 7 57. 0 63. 5 28. 8
Sources: Ghana People’s Security Survey, n=2081 and South African People’s Security Survey, n = 2099.28  DESA Working Paper No. 58
income security as a right (ILO, 2004: ch. 13). In a small way, this is shown, for example, in a survey in 
Mozambique carried out by the ILO in 2005, where over 80 per cent of what was admittedly a small sample 
believed there should be a guaranteed minimum income (Table 1). As can be seen, a large majority believed 
that the government should try to ensure that everybody has a minimum income on which to survive. A 
majority supported this even among those who were not poor themselves.
It is also apparent that people who are economically insecure are more likely to support a basic 
income, and people who are ‘individualists’ (i.e., those who believe that life chances are determined primarily 
by individual capacities) are more likely to do so than ‘fatalists’ (i.e., those who believe that personal circum-
stances are due to external forces). Given that globalization and economic liberalization, and ‘modernisation’, 
are associated both with more economic insecurity and more individualism, the percentage supporting a 
basic income can be expected to rise.
The standard arguments against providing a universal basic income are essentially fivefold.11 The first 
counter-claim is the cost, the claim being that to achieve a universal income transfer that gave basic econom-
ic security would cost too much of national income. Second, it is argued that an unconditional transfer, or a 
conditional transfer that required school attendance by the family’s children, would result in a lower labour 
supply, with women in particular dropping out of the labour force.
Third, it is claimed by some political scientists that it would offend the ‘reciprocity principle’ by 
giving someone a right without requiring them to display some return ‘responsibility’. Fourth, opponents 
claim that it would be hard to legitimize politically, since the ‘median voter’ would be opposed to giving tax 
income to everybody in society, regardless of their ‘contribution’. Fifth, it is claimed that an unconditional 
cash transfer would actually lower wages, since employers would feel that they need not pay workers so much 
because they would have another source of income.
For many years, critics held sway in debates on cash transfers. Now conditional cash transfers are le-
gitimized. But the flaws of all forms of targeting and the unnecessary costs are making more people question 
the need for them. What we can say is that only universalistic transfers would satisfy all the Policy Decision 
Principles enunciated earlier. And no other policy on offer could so strengthen a sense of social solidarity.
Concluding remarks
Globally, social protection systems are in a mess. The family as an institution of social support is weaken-
ing; local communities are often unable to provide social and economic security because of the tendency for 
whole communities to be struck at the same time; the state has been cutting back on universalistic income 
support; social insurance is giving way to social assistance, with an array of poverty traps and unemployment 
traps; and enterprises of employment are cutting back on their social benefits and services, at least for their 
workers.
This is the downside picture as the global economy lurches into what might be the next phase of 
a Global Transformation akin in many ways to the Great Transformation analysed by Karl Polanyi in the 
middle of the 20th century.12 The major new development has been that China has been moving towards a 
11  There have been numerous articles and books produced within BIEN on these issues since it started in 1986. For 
articles dealing with the claims and counter-claims in industrialized country contexts, see Standing (2005).
12  For a development of this theme, see Standing (2007).How Cash Transfers Boost Work and Economic Security          29
system in which cash transfers are growing, in the form of means-tested social assistance. They seem to be 
doing very little to arrest the high levels of poverty and inequality, or the social unrest associated with them. 
The state has introduced the means-tested dibao (minimum livelihood grants) for all the urban poor and for 
some of the rural poor, which will be extended to all the rural poor by the end of 2007. But the take up rate 
and coverage are worryingly low, even in urban areas (Chen, Ravallion and Wang, 2006). And one may pre-
dict that they will stay that way. Meanwhile, the other emerging industrial giant, India, has yet to confront 
the challenge of modernizing its chaotic social protection system. There are hundreds of selective schemes, 
some providing small or negligible cash payments, most languishing on the statute books and reaching very 
few people, except just before elections. There has been some political debate about the need for a minimum 
income support scheme for “unorganized workers”. But there seems an acute reluctance to address the sub-
ject seriously until after the next General Election.
Meanwhile, non-contributory cash transfers have surely been legitimized in many other parts of the 
world, and—at long last—in international agencies. Among the outcomes is the recognition that schemes 
that provide people with economic security actually encourage people to do more socially valuable and freely 
chosen forms of work. They do not “breed dependency” and passivity; they foster independence and activity.
A pathological fear of cash for the poor?
“The fear of giving money is almost pathological among aid agencies, even though, or 
maybe because, it would be simpler and cheaper to give than any other form of help.” 
(Sesman, 2004)
If decent work is to flourish, policymakers will have to rethink their commitment to universalism, 
social solidarity and social rights, to finding ways of moving towards a situation of basic economic security. 
Fortunately, there are economic and social reasons for doing so, as well as moral and political reasons. Uni-
versal schemes of security are fundamentally market neutral, i.e., they do not introduce market distortions 
and, therefore, have relatively little effect on competitiveness. Unlike social assistance, involving means-
testing, universalistic schemes do not introduce negative incentives to dissave (which would merely store up 
economic vulnerability), and there is no tendency to reward labour relative to other forms of work.
At present, the dominant discourse is still in favour of targeting, selectivity, and conditional benefits 
for the deserving poor. However, more social scientists and policymakers are raising critical questions about 
the efficiency and equity of selective interventions, while the imposition of behavioural conditionalities is 
paternalistic and presumes that the poor and insecure are irrational. If they are indeed unable to behave in 
the ways desired by the policymakers, then policy should focus on overcoming the obstacles or on providing 
them with improved information and education, rather than force them to do what the policymakers believe 
is in their interest.
Universal security schemes are administratively simple and low-cost, as has been demonstrated by 
the Namibian old-age pension. There is relatively little scope for bureaucratic abuse, discretionary behaviour 
or petty corruption. The benefits are non-stigmatising, and being universal, they help strengthen social soli-
darity. They can help strengthen community and social cohesion, and may even assist in developing a sense 
of national pride. And above all, universal economic security fosters full freedom. In such circumstances, 
decent work could flourish.30  DESA Working Paper No. 58
Putting money where their mouth is?
“Putting money in the hands of the poor can yield very high rates of return, partly 
because they use their assets so intensively and partly because the cost of falling below a 
critical consumption level is so great, small amounts can yield a high effective return.” 
(Subbarao, 2003: 28)
Societies in which decent and dignifying work can flourish must surely be based on economic secu-
rity, which is ultimately underpinned by the system of social protection. For that to be meaningful, it must 
enhance principles of social solidarity, freedom, autonomy and fraternity. This leads to a crucial point, which 
is that social protection should be linked to stronger Voice in society, if it is to strengthen social solidarity 
and promote decent work. During the 20th century, trades unions played a vital role in linking social protec-
tion to labour market involvement. Unions have weakened. In the 21st century, the economically insecure 
will wish to rely on other forms of civil society organization, which will be needed to protect them as they 
indulge in more flexible and more informal forms of work.
Meanwhile, overcoming the cutback in social provision is the immediate challenge. An integral 
feature of the economic liberalization model of globalization is the incessant pressure to cut social protection 
expenditure. In giving way to this pressure, governments have made the social protection system much less of 
a counter-cyclical stabilizer. This means that economic recessions lead to greater declines in consumption and 
employment and more volatility and uncertainty in incomes. That, in turn, leads to sub-optimal risk- taking 
by those in relatively insecure situations, as they have to be prepared for shocks or adverse outcomes in the 
external economic environment.
At the international level, one promising development associated with the international trend to-
wards inter-agency cooperation in aid programming is that the livelihoods approach is becoming increasingly 
central to the way donors and the UN’s specialized agencies consider policy options. This means that single 
commodity-based approaches, reviewed earlier in this paper, are less likely to be the most common, standard-
ized response to development needs. This may influence Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, if they continue, 
and lead to a shift to cash transfers and income grants as part of a package of remedial interventions. This may 
become a powerful means by which decent work opportunities expand. Policymakers may come to accept that 
encouraging people to take productive risks will be among the most effective ways to promote decent work.
For a basic income to become a reality, policymakers and aid officials must first come to accept that 
cash transfers are a viable way of combating poverty and income insecurity, and a viable way of promoting 
sustainable livelihoods.
In general, one of the political and socio-economic dilemmas about moving in the direction of 
universal basic income transfers concerns prioritization. The Latin American schemes have focused on 
households with children, using child school attendance as the primary condition. Reformers there often talk 
about extending the transfers to other groups by stages, the groups chosen being determined by the depth of 
poverty and vulnerability in the group and the political ability to legitimize transfers to particular groups. In 
Africa, more advance has been made at the other end of the age spectrum, with social pensions.
The cost of cash transfers is not the primary issue, since even poor countries could afford modest 
schemes, and most could do so if more aid were diverted to that end. The bigger question is whether the How Cash Transfers Boost Work and Economic Security          31
world wishes to combat poverty directly by this means and enhance the livelihoods and work of those cur-
rently trapped by poverty and inequality.
The UNDP has conducted a simulation study, finding that targeting all rural children rather than all 
the identifiably poor children would have a greater poverty reduction effect if just 0. 5 per cent of GDP were 
allocated to such cash transfers (Kakwani, Soares and Son, 2005). They reckon that cash transfers to achieve 
an income of 40 per cent of the poverty line would cost 5 per cent of GDP for the Ivory Coast and more for 
some other African countries. But even small cash transfers would have a big effect in reducing poverty in all 
the 15 countries studied.
Other simulation studies have found that in countries such as Namibia and South Africa a modest 
basic income as a monthly grant is affordable, and at least one government committee in South Africa has 
recommended its introduction.13 Such a scheme was also proposed as a response to the Indian Ocean tsu-
nami, and basic ‘freedom grants’ were proposed by various economists for the aftermath of the invasion and 
occupation of Iraq. In the case of the post-tsunami recovery phase, it was significant that the Swiss Agency 
for Development and Cooperation actually implemented such a scheme, with apparent success in terms of 
the effects observed in pilot schemes described earlier.
At the outset of this paper, five policy evaluation principles were laid out. The one worth reiterat-
ing in this conclusion is the Dignified Work Principle, since the evidence is gathering that cash transfers are 
a viable way, and perhaps the most efficient and equitable way of promoting dignified work and sustainable 
livelihoods. Contrary to elitist claims that giving the poor basic economic security would induce dependency 
and passivity, the evidence is accumulating that they promote independence and energetic work. Thus, one 
study, drawing on data from various surveys conducted by Statistics South Africa (the official agency for 
national statistics), showed that the country’s old-age pension, the Child Support Grant and the Disability 
Grant, all helped to raise labour force participation and employment (Samson and others, 2004).
This paper has been discussing conditional and unconditional cash transfers paid on a monthly or 
continuing basis. Another type of scheme is lump-sum or capital grant schemes, which have been more pop-
ular in industrialized countries as part of the “stakeholder society” agenda. We need not discuss them in the 
present context, but two schemes of this type have been put into effect, which could have a future in certain 
developing countries with one or two valuable commodities, where commodity price rises could threaten to 
produce a variant of “Dutch disease” unless the surplus is redistributed in some way.
The first is the provision of regular lump sums paid out to all citizens from a social investment 
fund, so that the amount given to people is determined by the rate of return and size of the capital fund. 
Something like this was proposed in the 1970s in Sweden, under the name of wage-earner funds. But the 
main example in practice has been the Alaska Permanent Fund, under which all residents of Alaska receive 
an annual dividend to spend on whatever they wish. The scheme has been popular in Alaska, and research 
has found that recipients have been enabled to improve their spending on consumer durables, in particular. 
The point is that it provides a modicum of economic security, without in any way undermining the willing-
ness to work.
13  See, for example, the papers in Standing and Samson (2004) and Taylor Committee (2002).32  DESA Working Paper No. 58
The other type of lump-sum scheme is the baby bond, which was launched by the New Labour 
Government in the UK. It is intended as a modest means of income redistribution, aimed at reducing child 
poverty, although the actual pay out is made only when the child becomes a young adult. Some prominent 
US politicians have proposed that such a scheme should be introduced in the USA, and more ambitious 
proposals for larger capital grants have been made by academic analysts (Ackerman and Alstott, 1999; Acker-
man, Alstott and van Parijs, 2006).
Such ideas may seem way off the radar screen in developing countries. But if the globalization pro-
cess continues to result in high returns to key commodities coupled with a steady shift of national incomes 
from labour to capital, the scope for ingenious cash transfers to the economically insecure and poor may 
become much more interesting for those who have faith in the creative and work capacities of their people. 
The debate is in full flow.
A final point: There is a frenzy of renewed interest among social scientists in happiness and well-be-
ing. Both are seen as depending, in part, not just on income level but on economic security. The latter is seen 
as producing more productive individuals and more socially-cohesive communities. As such, providing basic 
income security may have cumulative advantages and lead to more productive and engaged working commu-
nities. That is what dignified work should be all about.How Cash Transfers Boost Work and Economic Security          33
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